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The currency markets have been extremely disturbed for the last 
three months. The period witnessed a major strengthening of 
the US dollar in September, then the European currency crisis, 
a recovery of the euro when the markets believed that the crisis 
was being controlled, and then a rebound of the dollar. In view 
of these developments, those who follow currency movements 
need a new guide as to how the current values of currencies 
compare to our estimates of fundamental equilibrium exchange 
rates (FEERs).1 That is the main object of this paper.
1. As set forth in earlier issues (e.g., Cline and Williamson 2011), Williamson’s 
concept of the fundamental equilibrium exchange rate refers to the rate at 
which external imbalances and capital flows would be sustainable indefinitely.  
We apply a benchmark of +/- 3 percent of GDP as the limits on current 
account imbalances consistent with sustainability (except for oil-exporting 
economies).  We assume that exchange-rate changes undertaken to move to a 
country’s FEER would be accompanied by any necessary parallel changes in 
fiscal and monetary policy to maintain internal balance (in prices and employ-
ment).  Our method applies a matrix inversion technique to translate needed 
changes in real effective exchange rates into a set of changes in bilateral rates 
against the dollar (see Cline 2008).
The first section is devoted to a brief exposition of the 
main  changes  that  have  occurred  since  April,  which  our 
previous  publication  used  as  the  benchmark.  The  second 
section updates information on the levels of effective exchange 
rates consistent with the FEER targets identified in our most 
recent estimates (Cline and Williamson 2011), as well as the 
FEER-consistent  dollar  rates  as  of  late  October.  The  third 
section steps outside our normal frame of reference in order 
to make some comments about the situation within Europe in 
view of the sovereign debt crisis currently raging there. 
Developments since April
From  April  through  July  the  real  effective  exchange  rate 
(REER) of the dollar remained virtually unchanged. However, 
beginning in August and especially thereafter, the dollar REER 
rose significantly, reaching 3.4 percent above the April level 
in the first two weeks of October.2 By end-October, however, 
the REER stood only slightly above the April level (by 0.9 
percent).3  Even  though  the  United  States  was  downgraded 
from  AAA  by  Standard  and  Poor’s  after  the  partisan  fight 
about the debt ceiling, US Treasuries have still been treated 
by investors as a safe-haven asset to run to at a time of crisis. 
Hence the sovereign debt crisis in Europe, and the general 
flight  from  assets  perceived  as  risky  to  which  it  gave  rise, 
tended to strengthen the dollar. Presumably this strengthening 
would have been even greater in the absence of the downgrade. 
Even at its peak, however, the renewed safe-haven effect was 
much milder than in the previous episode, when the REER 
for the dollar rose 14.4 percent from July 2008 to March 2009 
(Federal Reserve 2011). 
The safe-haven increase was certainly present against the 
euro.  Although  the  dollar-euro  rate  was  fairly  stable  from 
April until early September, the euro then went into a signifi-
cant decline, presumably as a result of the European crisis. 
2. Using the Federal Reserve’s broad real effective exchange rate index for April 
and September, and extrapolating to late October by applying the Federal 
Reserve weights to partner currencies and deflating by country inflation rates. 
3. We use the average rate of October 27–31 for this update. N u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 1 8   N O Ve m b e r  2 0 1 1
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It hit a local minimum in early October, and by late in the 
month recovered practically all of the loss, before the surprise 
announcement on October 31 of a Greek referendum at least 
temporarily pushed the currency back to the September level.4 
The pattern of weakening in September and early October 
was replicated in many other currencies, contributing to the 
strength of the dollar. 
The two major currencies in which the pattern appeared 
differently were the Japanese yen and the Chinese yuan. The 
Japanese yen has tended to strengthen throughout the period, 
in both bilateral and effective terms, until the intervention on 
October 31 pushed it down by 3 percent. As another safe-haven 
currency,  it  strengthened  even  more  from  early  September 
onwards, in terms of the dollar and in terms of its effective rate. 
In contrast, the Chinese yuan is an administered currency, whose 
value depends upon government policy. It has been the policy 
of China to administer a gradual appreciation of the yuan in 
terms of the dollar (judging by deeds, although this is contrary 
to  the  inaccurate  Chinese  pronouncements  on  their  policy 
which describe it as managed floating; see appendix A), and 
this process has been maintained throughout the period. It may 
appear paradoxical to the Chinese authorities, since they did 
not accelerate the appreciation of the RMB against the dollar, 
but the fact is that this policy and the movements of the other 
currencies resulted in the effective exchange rate of the yuan 
appreciating quite rapidly in September and early October, then 
easing slightly again as they continued to ride the dollar. Overall 
the RMB experienced an effective real appreciation of about 5 
percent from April to late October, in part because of inflation 
above that of the United States and other key economies.5
The biggest problem throughout this period has been the 
sovereign debt crisis in Europe. This is not the place to rehearse 
the details, but the lack of exchange-rate flexibility was known 
to  be  a  potential  cost  of  European  monetary  unification 
from the start, and this is the first time that it has hurt since 
creation of the euro. Countries that have had Fund programs 
have normally had highly competitive exchange rates, either 
because  they  deliberately  devalued,  or  because  the  Fund 
required devaluation, or because they had flexible exchange 
rates and the market took the value of their currencies lower. 
In the cases of Greece, Ireland, and Portugal, this was not 
4. The rate was 1.45 dollars per euro in April as a whole and an average of 
1.43 in July–August. It then fell to 1.38 in September and 1.35 for the first 
two weeks of October, before rebounding to an average of 1.41 in October 
27–31. By November 9 intensification of the crisis in Italy pushed the euro 
down further, to about 1.36 to the dollar.
5. Over this period the yuan rose 2.7 percent against the dollar, and dif-
ferential inflation between the two economies amounted to 0.9 percent. The 
remaining rise in the REER of the yuan reflected its riding the dollar up, as 
the REER of the dollar rose 0.9 percent.
possible because the countries had locked their exchange rates 
by entering the euro. None of them were sufficiently large to 
imagine that the value of the euro would be determined, or 
indeed significantly influenced, by their policies or needs. Its 
value was as likely to change in what was a perverse direction 
from the standpoint of their needs as it was to change in a 
benign direction. This is presumably one of the factors—along 
with concerns about the magnitude of their debt burdens, and 
the contagious effects of their neighbors‘ problems—that has 
underlain the lack of market confidence in them. We have 
more to say about this issue in section 3.
UpDAteD effective exchAnge rAtes 
Our most recent estimates of how far exchange rates lie from 
the FEER levels were made in May and related to the data of 
April (see Cline and Williamson 2011). These estimates were 
based on the medium-term current account projections made 
by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in its April 2011 
issue of the World Economic Outlook (WEO), as updated from 
the IMF’s February base to our April base. 
We  maintain  our  traditional  practice  of  calculating 
FEERs only once per year. That is, we assume the set of FEERs 
published in May were correct (see table 1 for our estimates of 
FEERs in April), and seek to ask what the intervening changes 
in market exchange rates and differential inflation imply for 
the current degrees of misalignment of the major currencies.
Table  1  reports  estimated  FEERs  and  the  real  effective 
exchange rates for April and late October (final three days) of 
the 30 countries for which we have been estimating FEERs. 
Column 3 shows the percent change that was needed in order to 
reach the level that was estimated as the FEER in April. Column 
5 shows the same thing as of late October (assuming that the 
FEER was unchanged from that calculated in May). The final 
column shows whether we judge a currency to be overvalued 
(O), undervalued (U), or within 2.5 percent of equilibrium 
(E). Table 2 reports the corresponding levels of recent bilateral 
rates in terms of the dollar as compared to the FEER-consistent 
exchange rates against the dollar. Table 3 summarizes. It can 
be seen that the US dollar has returned very close to the same 
level as in April, despite its strong intervening appreciation. 
(It appreciated again in early November, as we went to press.) 
The dollar thus remains overvalued by about the same amount 
as in April, about 9 percent. In contrast, the Chinese RMB is 
substantially closer to equilibrium, falling from 16.0 percent 
to 10.6 percent undervalued. The euro’s depreciation has not 
been sufficient to make us change our judgment that it is close 
to equilibrium. The yen’s appreciation carried it from a zone N u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 1 8   N O Ve m b e r  2 0 1 1
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close to equilibrium to an overvalued effective rate, and even the 
intervention of October 31 has left it effectively overvalued.6
6. As indicated in table 1, by late October the REER of the yen was 9 percent 
above our FEER estimate. The bilateral rate against the dollar remained 
weaker than the target that would attain if all countries realigned to their 
FEERs, however (table 2) reflecting the high share of regional trading partners 
with presently undervalued currencies.
Most other countries’ effective exchange rates have to be 
understood in terms of not only their own changes (usually 
against the dollar), but also in terms of the changes among the 
four basic currencies. For example, Argentina has had an effec-
tive appreciation as a result of depreciating relatively slowly 
against the dollar despite relatively high inflation, so that it is 
now distinctly more overvalued (table 1). The Brazilian real 
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Argentina 80.7 83.0 –2.7 85.3 –5.4 O
Australia 99.8 117.3 –14.9 118.1 –15.5 O
Brazil 117.1 130.3 –10.1 123.6 –5.2 O
Canada 107.8 108.5 –0.6 104.2 3.5 U
Chile 104.4 106.7 –2.1 104.2 0.2 E
China 131.0 113.0 16.0 118.4 10.6 U
Colombia 111.8 114.2 –2.1 112.1 –0.3 E
Czech Republic 114.5 115.7 –1.0 114.1 0.4 E
Euro area 96.1 98.3 –2.3 97.6 –1.6 E
Hong Kong 101.7 90.4 12.5 88.2 15.4 U
Hungary 97.5 103.5 –5.9 90.3 8.0 U
India 109.3 111.2 –1.7 106.8 2.4 E
Indonesia 103.9 105.7 –1.8 104.9 –1.0 E
Israel 119.0 120.1 –0.9 115.8 2.7 U
Japan 116.0 118.2 –1.8 127.5 –9.0 O
Korea 78.0 79.3 –1.6 78.0 –0.0 E
Malaysia 114.7 102.0 12.4 100.0 14.7 U
Mexico 99.1 99.8 –0.7 87.8 12.9 U
New Zealand 79.6 97.2 –18.2 100.8 –21.0 O
Philippines 105.7 107.3 –1.5 108.4 –2.5 E
Poland 95.3 100.1 –4.8 91.5 4.1 U
Singapore 141.2 113.8 24.1 116.2 21.5 U
South Africa 95.0 113.4 –16.2 100.6 –5.5 O
Sweden 109.2 101.9 7.2 101.1 8.0 U
Switzerland 132.9 120.3 10.5 125.3 6.1 U
Taiwan 108.7 96.5 12.7 92.4 17.7 U
Thailand 101.1 102.9 –1.8 100.5 0.6 E
Turkey 69.0 97.4 –29.1 88.2 –21.7 O
United Kingdom 78.7 79.7 –1.3 81.0 –2.8 O
United States 81.3 88.8 –8.5 89.6 –9.3 O
FEER = fundamental equilibrium rates 
REER = real effective exchange rate
O = overvalued
U = undervalued
E = equilibrium 
a.  Average:  October 27, 28, 31.
Source: Authors’ calculationsN u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 1 8   N O Ve m b e r  2 0 1 1
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was appreciating against the dollar until September, but then 
it fell by more against the dollar than most other currencies did 
so that its effective exchange rate actually decreased, resulting 
in a net reduction in its overvaluation (which may still be 
underestimated, as a result of the relatively optimistic IMF 
projections).  Similarly,  after  remaining  almost  unchanged 
against the dollar from April to August, the Malaysian ringgit 
fell  by  about  5  percent  against  the  dollar  in  September 
through early October, and then rebounded about half way, 
until there was a new fall at the turn of the month. As a result, 
its undervaluation increased. The same pattern occurred with 
considerably greater force for Mexico, as the peso depreciated 
by about 11 percent from April to late October relative to the 
dollar. As a result, the Mexican peso has become even more 
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Argentina 4.00 11.5 4.17 4.07 1.5 4.24 1.7
Australia* 1.02 3.5 1.02 1.06 –3.8 1.07 –4.8
Brazil 1.65 6.6 1.68 1.58 –4.1 1.71 1.5
Canada 0.94 2.9 0.94 0.96 1.7 0.99 5.5
Chile 454 3.1 454 470 3.5 491 8.0
China 5.09 5.5 5.15 6.53 28.4 6.36 23.5
Colombia 1784 3.3 1786 1806 1.2 1866 4.4
Czech Republic 16.3 1.8 16.2 16.8 3.2 17.6 8.6
Euro area* 1.50 2.5 1.51 1.45 3.9 1.41 6.9
Hong Kong 5.92 5.5 5.99 7.77 31.3 7.77 29.7
Hungary 185 3.7 186 184 –0.9 215 15.6
India 41.0 10.6 42.5 44.4 8.2 49.0 15.3
Indonesia 7554 5.7 7652 8647 14.5 8840 15.5
Israel 3.29 3.4 3.30 3.43 4.2 3.60 9.3
Japan 75.8 –0.4 74.5 83.2 9.8 76.5 2.7
Korea 979 4.5 986 1085 10.8 1110 12.5
Malaysia 2.35 3.2 2.35 3.01 28.3 3.08 31.0
Mexico 11.6 3.4 11.6 11.7 1.2 13.2 13.5
New Zealand* 0.70 4.4 0.70 0.79 –11.2 0.82 –14.9
Philippines 38.2 4.5 38.5 43.2 13.0 42.7 10.9
Poland 2.76 4.0 2.8 2.75 –0.4 3.08 11.1
Singapore 0.90 3.7 0.91 1.25 37.9 1.25 37.4
South Africa 7.38 5.9 7.49 6.72 –8.9 7.77 3.8
Sweden 5.56 3.0 5.56 6.20 11.5 6.40 15.0
Switzerland 0.78 0.7 0.77 0.90 14.6 0.87 11.8
Taiwan 22.8 1.8 22.7 29.0 27.2 29.9 32.2
Thailand 27.0 4.0 27.1 30.1 11.5 30.6 13.1
Turkey 1.98 6.0 2.01 1.52 –23.1 1.75 –12.7
United Kingdom* 1.71 4.5 1.69 1.64 4.2 1.61 5.1
United States 1.00 3.0 1.00 1.00 0 1.00 0
FEER = fundamental equilibrium rates
* US dollars per currency unit
a.  Most recent available 12 months.
b.  Average:  October 27, 28, 31.
Source: IMF (2011a); authors’ calculationsN u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 1 8   N O Ve m b e r  2 0 1 1
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undervalued than the RMB. The shift from equilibrium in 
April to undervaluation by October for Mexico and (to a more 
moderate extent) Canada, combined with their large weights 
in US trade, plays a considerable role in the behavior of the 
REER of the dollar.
Most of the cases judged to be overvalued are old favor-
ites: Australia, Brazil, New Zealand, South Africa, Turkey, and 
the United States. However, there are also three additions to 
the list: Argentina, Japan, and the United Kingdom. Argentina 
presumably got there because the authorities placed electoral 
expediency ahead of maintaining the external position. Japan 
has become overvalued in effective terms as a result of the 
strong appreciation of the yen on account of its safe-haven 
properties. Of course, some competitors of Japan in the United 
States will still find Japanese competition to be extremely stiff 
despite the fact that our analysis suggests this cannot plausibly 
be attributed to the behavior of the yen, even after its recent 
depreciation. Britain’s overvaluation is marginal.
The  cases  of  undervaluation  are  again  a  mixture  of 
the  familiar  and  the  new.  Among  the  familiar,  there  are  a 
number  of  East  Asian  economies,  notably  China,  Hong 
Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, and Taiwan. In Europe, there are 
the two familiar cases of Sweden (whose undervaluation has 
increased) and Switzerland (whose undervaluation has been 
much reduced, but not eliminated, by the strong appreciation 
of the Swiss franc).7 The most interesting cases are the many 
7. The Swiss have been widely complaining of overvaluation, and anyone 
who has stayed in Switzerland recently is aware that Switzerland is a very 
expensive country. From the end of 2010 to its peak on August 9, 2011, the 
Swiss franc rose from 1.25 per euro to only 1.04 per euro. On September 6, 
the Swiss National Bank announced that “massive overvaluation of the Swiss 
franc poses an acute threat” and that it was “therefore aiming for a substantial 
and sustained weakening of the Swiss franc” (SNB 2011). The central bank 
announced that it would place a limit of at least 1.2 Swiss francs per euro, and 
in October the currency was back to a range of 1.22 to 1.24 per euro. Our 
criterion of absence of misalignment, however, is that the expected current 
balance in the medium term (when exchange rates have played through) be 
no more than +/- 3 percent of GDP. The most recent WEO places the 2016 
current account surplus at 9.9 percent of GDP (IMF 2011a), and even after 
making our statistical adjustment cutting the estimate by 4 percent of GDP 
(see Cline and Williamson, 2010, p. 4), the expected current account surplus 
of Switzerland in 2016 would substantially exceed 3 percent of GDP without a 
further appreciation. Nor has the problem been a serious trade deficit masked 
by a huge capital services surplus. On the contrary, Switzerland has run enor-
mous surpluses on trade in goods and non-capital services as well, reaching 7.4 
percent of GDP in 2009 and 10.9 percent in 2010 (when the current account 
surpluses reached 11.4 percent of GDP and 15.8 percent, respectively; IMF 
2011a, b). We can see no justification for the claim of “massive overvaluation” 
for an economy running surpluses this high, on both the trade and current 
account balances. 
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Table 3     Estimated overvaluations as of late  













Czech Republic –0.4 –8.6
Euro area 1.6 –6.9



















United Kingdom 2.8 –5.1
United States 9.3 0.0
a. Average: October 27, 28, 31.
b. If all currencies move to their fundamental equilibrium rates.
Source: Authors’ calculations
The dollar remains overvalued by about the 
same amount as in April, about 9 percent.  In 
contrast, the Chinese RMB is substantially 
closer to equilibrium, with its undervaluation 
falling from 16 percent to 10.6 percent. 
… [T]he Mexican peso has become even 
more undervalued than the RMB.N u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 1 8   N O Ve m b e r  2 0 1 1
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additions to this group: Canada, Hungary, Israel, Mexico, and 
Poland.  Canada  became  marginally  undervalued  because  it 
depreciated against the dollar along with many other curren-
cies, but has almost no other countries that play an important 
role in the index of its effective exchange rate. The undervalu-
ations of Israel and Poland are also marginal. The same cannot 
be said of Hungary or Mexico, however, whose depreciations 
were large.
It is also worth noting that areas judged to be in equi-
librium  are  the  euro  area,  India,  Indonesia,  Korea,  the 
Philippines,  and  Thailand,  as  well  as  a  number  of  smaller 
countries. The judgment that the euro area is in overall equi-
librium does not imply that there are not serious disequilibria 
within it, which we discuss in the next section. Note that the 
euro area, and not the countries that constitute it, is the object 
of our analysis because it is a currency area. The findings that 
Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand are in overall 
equilibrium  means  that  the  undervaluations  elsewhere  in 
East Asia cannot be dismissed as a regional phenomenon that 
could equally well be described as a dollar overvaluation.8 (Of 
course, there is also a dollar overvaluation, as our analysis has 
made clear.)
If one examines FEER-consistent dollar exchange rates 
(table 2), one finds that there are many more instances of 
undervaluation than of overvaluation. Only three countries, 
Australia, New Zealand, and Turkey, would need to depre-
ciate with respect to the dollar, on the assumption that all 
other countries moved to equilibrium rates as well. To say 
the same thing another way, there are only three of the 30 
currencies that we examine that were more overvalued than 
the dollar. The exchange rates of countries that were found 
8. These four currencies would be undervalued individually against the dollar 
bilaterally in a range of 11 to 16 percent if all other currencies were to realign 
to their FEER levels, however (table 2). The difference reflects their high trade 
shares with regional trading partners that would all appreciate against the 
dollar in such a realignment.
to be undervalued on an effective basis need to change far 
more in terms of the dollar. In addition, many countries that 
were in equilibrium on an effective basis would need to appre-
ciate their exchange rates quite substantially with respect to 
the dollar if all other countries were to move to equilibrium. 
Even countries that were found to be overvalued on an effec-
tive basis (for example, Brazil, Japan, and South Africa) would 
need to appreciate against the dollar in the context of a general 
realignment to FEER-consistent exchange rates.
The FEER-consistent dollar rates are of course identical 
to those estimated in May of this year (after adjustment for 
inflation  differentials);  the  difference  lies  in  the  distance 
that exchange rates need to traverse from their present levels 
(interpreted as the average of the last three days of October) 
in order to reach equilibrium. The Japanese yen was strongly 
overvalued on an effective basis (at least prior to the interven-
tion of October 31), but it was not overvalued in terms of 
the US dollar. The euro is close to equilibrium on an effective 
basis, but it is undervalued relative to the dollar, and would 
therefore require a significant appreciation if all other curren-
cies were moving to FEERs. The same contrast applies to an 
even greater degree for the Korean won. In the important case 
of the RMB, the decline in the extent of undervaluation of the 
REER (from 16 percent to 10.6 percent) exceeds the decline 
in undervaluation against the dollar in a context of global 
realignment (from 28 percent to 24 percent).
The Japanese intervention of October 31 has been widely 
condemned, but there was a case for it. Prior to the interven-
tion the yen was overvalued by some 9.8 percent, which is 
about the margin where intervention can be judged reason-
able (see, for example, Williamson 2007). There was not much 
overvaluation against the dollar, but this is an inappropriate 
nationalistic criterion. It would be interesting if those who 
condemned this intervention would lay out the conditions 
under which they judge intervention to be justified.
Comparison  of  Japan  to  Switzerland  provides  a  useful 
prism for illuminating internationally responsible exchange-
rate intervention. Both countries experienced major pressure 
for currency appreciation as a consequence of the safe-haven 
effect. Both countries intervened to resist this pressure. But 
because the yen was already substantially overvalued whereas 
the Swiss franc remained substantially undervalued, Japan’s 
intervention was justifiable whereas Switzerland’s was not.
eUrope
In the series of FEER estimates beginning in mid-2008, we 
have consciously treated the euro region as a single currency 
area, and have therefore regarded intra-euro-area imbalances 
Japan and Switzerland experienced currency 
appreciation as a consequence of the safe-
haven effect. … [B]ecause the yen was 
already substantially overvalued whereas 
the Swiss franc remained substantially 
undervalued, Japan’s intervention was 
justifiable whereas Switzerland’s was not.N u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 1 8   N O Ve m b e r  2 0 1 1
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as outside our remit. However, it was well known when the 
euro was created that there was a danger that there would be 
a price to pay for preventing the use of the exchange rate in 
the adjustment process, and there were many economists who 
warned against the danger of a premature move to European 
monetary union. Since this is the focus of the present crisis, 
however, it seems impossible to maintain the stance of ignoring 
intra-area imbalances at the present time. 
In a currency union in which all governments are thought 
to pose zero (or identical) sovereign risk, and in which the 
commitment to the single currency is believed to be unam-
biguous, there should be no interest differentials across the 
sovereign obligations of the member states. This is an impli-
cation of uncovered interest rate parity, whereby under free 
capital flows the interest rate differential must be equal to the 
expected rate of depreciation of one currency against another.
For the first eight years of its existence, the euro area closely 
resembled this textbook case. The member governments were 
regarded as having essentially the same credit risk, probably 
reflecting  the  widespread  belief  that  for  modern  industrial 
countries,  sovereign  default  was  a  historical  artifact  of  the 
1930s. Thus, from the beginning of the euro in 1999 through 
2007 the maximum spread above the 10-year German bund 
rate for any of the peripheral European economies was only 
about 40 basis points, essentially de minimus. The implication 
was perceived near-zero sovereign risk combined with assured 
exchange rate parity. 
That paradigm has now collapsed for members of the euro 
area. The demise of assured sovereign solvency began with the 
emergence of country risk spreads among euro area members 
in the 2008 global financial crisis.9 The opening up of interest 
rate differentials above the German bund meant that in the 
face of acute international uncertainty, investors had begun 
to question either the iron-clad certainty of continuation of 
membership in the euro, or the certainty of negligible sover-
eign credit risk, or both. The paradigm shift was forcefully 
escalated by the revelation of previously misleading data on 
Greek public debt at the beginning of 2010. 
With  the  introduction  of  doubt  about  the  euro  and 
sovereign  risk,  euro  area  countries  have  become  more  like 
normal countries, which are vulnerable to sudden stops of 
capital flows. Even though the usual trigger mechanism for 
an external debt crisis—massive loss of reserves and forced 
devaluation—is much more attenuated, the rise in sovereign 
spreads for the vulnerable members constitutes a slow-motion 
9. In the first quarter of 2009, the trough of the Great Recession panic, the 
spread between 10-year government obligations over those of Germany 
reached an average of 252 basis points for Greece, 215 for Ireland, 130 for 
Portugal, 134 for Italy, and 93 for Spain (Datastream).
crisis. Moreover, perhaps in part because of the practice of 
treating  (and  usually,  formally  rating)  private  firms  as,  at 
best, no better than their sovereign, the interest rate pressures 
spread to the private sector. Under these circumstances, the 
vulnerable government needs not only to reduce government 
debt relative to GDP; it is also needs to reduce the current 
account deficit to a level that the markets will finance.
The  advent  of  a  growing  influence  of  current  account 
imbalances on euro area sovereign risk spreads can be tested. 
For 13 euro area economies,10 a pooled regression using quar-
terly  data  for  2010:1  through  2011:3  yields  the  following 
results for the 10-year sovereign spread above the German 
bund rate (with t-statistics in parentheses).
S = –1.74 – 0.176 CA + 0.0447 D; adj R2 = 0.47
    Y
  (–2.7) (–3.32)  (5.47)
Here, CA is the current account balance as a percent of 
GDP, and D/Y is the ratio of gross general government debt 
to GDP.11 The test applies the gross debt ratio rather than the 
conceptually more appropriate net debt ratio, largely because 
the markets seem to focus primarily on the gross measure. Both 
the usual debt to GDP ratio and the current account ratio 
turn out to be statistically significant. The debt ratio appears 
to have the greater weight, however. Thus, a move from the 
25th percentile current account deficit observation (1.7 percent 
of GDP surplus) to the 75th percentile (3.6 percent of GDP 
deficit) causes an increase in the sovereign spread by 94 basis 
points. In comparison, a move from the 25th percentile for the 
public debt ratio (54 percent) to the 75th percentile (96 percent) 
boosts the sovereign spread by 188 basis points.12 Of course, not 
all the euro area countries were considered in danger of breaking 
with Germany. In short, within the euro area the level of public 
debt is the primary influence on the sovereign risk spread, but 
the size of the current account deficit also matters.
A popular view is that the peripheral economies grew into 
overvaluation because of excessive inflation relative to Germany. 
This position has been fortified by figure 1, which shows the 
movement of the unit-labor-cost-based REERs of six European 
countries relative to other members of the euro area since the 
10. Excluding Cyprus, Estonia, Luxembourg, and Malta.
11. Both are from the IMF (2011a). Quarterly estimates are from moving 
weights on the relevant annual figures. 
12. Note further that when applying a panel approach in which a dummy 
variable is applied for each economy to remove unobservable country-specific 
influences, the significance of the current account variable disappears and the 
explanatory power of the debt ratio rises sharply. However, it may be that the 
main country difference is precisely its balance of payments position, which 
varies more between countries than over time.N u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 1 8   N O Ve m b e r  2 0 1 1
8
start of the euro up until the present day. The six countries 
shown are Germany and the five countries in crisis. The real 
effective  exchange  rate  is  based  on  1999  =  100.  This  chart 
suggests that the countries now in crisis have brought their woes 
upon themselves by inflating far more than in Germany (or, 
alternatively, that Germany has been the source of the problem 
because of excessive wage compression). 
Figure 2 is one that we constructed based on IMF figures 
using  instead  relative  unit  labor  costs  (ULCs)  against  27 
advanced economies, again setting 1999 = 100. This measure 
is more relevant to each country’s overall external sector perfor-
mance than one comparing the country just to euro area part-
ners. Although the broader base of comparison confirms the 
problem of rising overvaluation in Spain and Italy, it sharply 
reverses  the  diagnosis  for  Ireland  (which  by  2009–11  does 
better than Germany). It also leaves a much more moderate 
contrast between competitive performance for Germany on the 
one hand, and Greece and Portugal on the other, than indicated 
in figure 1. In short, the use of a more relevant gauge of relative 
unit labor costs weakens the persuasiveness of the popular view 
that the crisis can be blamed on differential inflation.13 
13. Note that the current account performances discussed below tend to 
confirm that figure 1 is misleading in diagnosing overvaluation for Ireland 
(which is now in current account surplus), whereas the moderation shown in 
figure 2 may be misleading for the case of Portugal (which has a large current 
account deficit).
Differential inflation is not the only reason that nominal 
exchange rates need to change, even if it tends to be the largest 
single reason in the long run. Real exchange rates may also 
need to change in order to offset other factors. The hope of 
the advocates of monetary union is that the necessary changes 
in real exchange rates will be sufficiently small that they can 
be accomplished by countries gaining or losing competitiveness 
while maintaining a constant nominal exchange rate. It is there-
fore worthwhile to form an estimate of how large a change in 
the real exchange rate would be needed to in order to reestablish 
payments equilibrium in the euro area.
Consider  the  case  of  Greece.  According  to  the  IMF 
(2011b), the present external position of Greece shows a net 
debt of $327 billion,14 which is about the same size as Greek 
14. This figure is due to be reduced as a result of the 50 percent write down 
in private-sector Greek assets agreed between the Institute of International 
Finance (IIF) and the European Union on October 26, 2011, but a new figure 
for Greek debt will depend on the (“voluntary”) take-up of this offer by bond 
holders.
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Figure 1     Real effective exchange rates relative to the euro area (unit labor costs based, 1999=100)
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“[W]ithin the euro area the level of public 
debt is the primary influence on the 
sovereign risk spread, but the size of the 
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GNP (converting to dollars at a rate of $0.7 = €1). If one posits 
(with the IMF) that the Greek nominal growth rate will reach 
3 percent or more again,15 then Greece could afford a current 
account  deficit  of  some  3  percent  of  GDP  without  further 
increasing its (foreign) debt/income ratio. Given that its fore-
cast deficit is some 8.4 percent of GDP this year (according to 
the IMF data in the WEO database), one needs an improve-
ment in the Greek current account of some 5.4 percent of GDP. 
Applying a current account impact coefficient of γ = –0.216 (1 
percent REER depreciation reduces the current account by 0.2 
percent of GDP), this suggests the need for a depreciation in the 
Greek real exchange rate of as much as 27 percent.
On the other hand, the WEO projects the Greek current 
account deficit at only 2 percent of GDP by 2016, on the usual 
WEO assumption of no change in the real exchange rate. In 
this case there would be no change needed in the Greek current 
account or exchange rate to remain within the present limit 
on net international liabilities relative to GDP. Hence if one 
believes the IMF forecast and one regards the somewhat anemic 
recovery of output as something that Greece could live with, 
15. We use the IMF forecasts (IMF 2011a) average of 2012–16, to calculate 
nominal growth rates.
16. For calculation of this parameter see Cline (2008). Data on exports of 
goods and services for this calculation are from the IMF (2011b).
one  would  not  be  concerned  about  Greek  current  account 
prospects.
Table 4 displays the figures calculated for Greece in the 
paragraph  before  last,  along  with  similar  calculations  for 
the other countries in crisis and for Germany. There are two 
variants for the current account target: the net international 
investment  position  (NIIP)  stabilization  just  discussed,  and 
the standard 3 percent of GDP imbalance used in our usual 
FEERs calculations. There are also two variants for the baseline 
current account: the 2011 base and the IMF’s 2016 projection 
(the usual benchmark in our FEERs estimates). The calculation 
of estimates for γ again follows Cline (2008). If the 2011 base 
is used, these figures suggest that Portugal faces the task of an 
even larger current account adjustment (and nearly as large a 
real depreciation) as Greece, but that the other European coun-
tries are considerably better off in this dimension, with Italy 
being the only conceivably problematic case. Ireland is already 
in current account surplus, while the Spanish adjustment is 
modest.17 The figures for Germany indicate that Germany has 
17. Note further that in the NIIP-based adjustment rules applied in table 
4, a country with a net international liability position should adjust only to 
the extent needed to avoid a further deterioration in the NIIP/GDP ratio; a 
country in a net international asset position should adjust only to the extent 
needed to avoid a further increase in the NIIP/GDP ratio. Because Ireland is a 
net international debtor, it need not curb the current account surplus through 
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Figure 1     Real effective exchange rates relative to the euro area (unit labor costs Based, 1999=100)
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scope to lose competitiveness while still retaining the confi-
dence of the markets. However, if the 2016 current account 
projections are used instead, then the current account imbal-
ances virtually disappear as a potential source of debt distress 
because the deficits are relatively small even for Greece and 
Portugal. Even so, one worries that the benign external balances 
projected for 2016 may depend unduly on sluggish domestic 
growth assumed in the IMF’s baseline.
For some time the challenge of achieving external adjust-
ment  within  the  confines  of  the  single  currency  has  been 
appreciation. In contrast, as a large international creditor with a large current 
account surplus, under the NIIP rule Germany needs to appreciate to avoid 
increasing the ratio.
approached with the strategy of “internal devaluation.” In the 
European context, this term has referred primarily to what 
used to be called “wage deflation.” In this process, curbs on 
wage  growth  (or  outright  wage  reductions),  together  with 
such reforms as liberalization of labor markets (e.g., reducing 
restrictions on firing and shifting collective bargaining from 
the industry level to the firm) have been the main avenue 
for achieving increased competitiveness with an unchanged 
currency.  An  intriguing  recent  innovation  which  is  being 
introduced into the programs for European countries adds 
another  instrument  for  implementing  internal  devaluation: 
fiscal devaluation. This is accomplished by changing the tax 
system in favor of exportables. For example, it is possible to 
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Greece –327 327 3.0 –3.0 –8.4 –2.0 –0.2
Ireland –221 223 4.0 –4.0 1.8 1.0 –0.5
Italy –593 2211 2.6 –0.7 –3.5 –1.7 –0.25
Portugal –250 244 2.6 –2.7 –8.6 –2.6 –0.27
Spain –1369 1518 3.4 –3.1 –3.8 –2.2 –0.23
Germany 1514 3531 2.3 1.0 5.0 4.0 –0.37









Greece 5.4 5.4 0 0
Ireland 0.0 0 0 0
Italy 2.8 0.5 1 0
Portugal 5.9 5.6 0 0
Spain 0.7 0.8 0 0
Germany –4.0 –2 –3.0 –1









Greece –27.0 –27.0 0.0 0.0
Ireland 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Italy –11.2 –2.0 –4.0 0.0
Portugal –22.0 –20.7 0.0 0.0
Spain –3.2 –3.5 0.0 0.0
Germany 10.8 5.4 8.1 2.7
NIIP:  net international investment position
NIIP basis, 2011 base = Objective is reducing the c/a deficit so that NIIP/GDP will not increase, assuming the deficit was not scheduled to fall
Standard basis, 2011 base = Objective is to reduce the c/a deficit to 3 percent of GDP, assuming the deficit was not scheduled to fall
NIIP basis, 2016 base = Objective is reducing the c/a deficit so that NIIP/GDP will not increase, assuming the deficit falls as in IMF forecast
Standard basis, 2016 base = Objective is to reduce the c/a deficit to 3 percent of GDP, assuming the deficit falls as in IMF forecast
Source: Cline (2008); IMF (2011a); IMF(2011b); authors’ calculationsN u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 1 8   N O Ve m b e r  2 0 1 1
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reduce the taxes on factors used in producing exportables and 
increase those on domestic consumption. A program to this 
effect has been adopted by Portugal, which proposes to increase 
the value-added tax on domestic consumption while reducing 
the taxation of labor inputs to production, which will favor 
inter alia exportables (since indirect but not direct taxes are 
rebated at the border), the total changes being calculated to be 
revenue neutral. An important question is how large a devalu-
ation could be effected by this means. The answer is presum-
ably that it is limited on the one hand by the maximum level 
of value-added taxation that is politically tolerable, and on the 
other hand by the size of pre-existing taxes on inputs. It seems 
unlikely that a country would be able to achieve an internal 
devaluation of greater than 10 percent or so, which even on 
a pessimistic reading of the above figures goes a significant 
part of the way—but only a part of the way—to resolving 
the Greek and Portuguese problems as diagnosed by the 2011 
baseline. There would almost certainly be an adverse effect on 
income distribution, but given the trade-off with increased 
unemployment this might be accepted. 
conclUsions
In  September  and  early  October  the  US  dollar  temporarily 
emerged  as  a  more  substantially  overvalued  currency  than 
before due to the run-up in the dollar, but by late October 
US overvaluation was approximately back to the same single-
digit level as in our previous estimates applying an April base 
(about 9 percent). Return to greater dollar overvaluation as a 
consequence of a renewed depreciation of the euro to enable 
Europe to export its way out of its problems is not a desirable 
policy option from the standpoint of global imbalances. If this 
happens, it could set the stage for a new dollar crisis, which 
might easily be of even greater severity than the European 
crisis that has so preoccupied the world in recent months. 
On the contrary, the euro is not only appropriately valued 
at  present  from  the  standpoint  of  the  euro  area’s  effective 
exchange rate, but it is also undervalued bilaterally against the 
dollar when judged against the rates that would result from a 
general realignment of exchange rates toward FEERs. Such a 
realignment would certainly involve major appreciations by 
the currencies that have been traditionally undervalued, in 
particular—though not exclusively—in East Asia. At the same 
time,  the  adjustment  of  international  imbalances  will  also 
require a willingness to accept that an expansion of domestic 
demand has to be the basis of renewed growth in most areas 
that have not suffered big deficits in the past.
It is an interesting fact that our analysis has concluded 
that neither the misalignment of the dollar nor the euro has 
changed much since April, while the undervaluation of the 
RMB fell and the yen became overvalued. Are these findings 
mutually consistent? Yes, but only because two of the smaller 
currencies which happen to play a big role in the US effective 
exchange rate—namely the Mexican peso and the Canadian 
dollar—both  depreciated  and  emerged  as  undervalued 
currencies.
For  its  part,  the  current  European  crisis  is  first  and 
foremost a crisis of confidence in sovereign debt driven by 
unsustainable fiscal imbalances, together with a much more 
stringent market treatment of high public debt levels now that 
there has been a paradigm shift recognizing that even industrial 
countries—and even ones belonging to the euro—can default. 
Within Europe, part of the solution to the present crisis will 
have to be reductions in the large current account deficits of 
Greece and Portugal. The IMF forecasts are optimistic that 
The current account deficit of 8.4 percent 
of GDP this year … suggests the need for 
a depreciation of the Greek real exchange 
rate of as much as 27 percent … Portugal 
faces the task of an even larger current 
account adjustment.  However, if the 
2016 current account projections [of 
the IMF] are used instead, the current 
account imbalances virtually disappear. 
… We are less certain, and consider it 
important that the strategy of “internal 
devaluation” and its new variant, “fiscal 
devaluation,” be pursued vigorously …   
Return to greater dollar overvaluation as 
a consequence of a renewed depreciation 
of the euro to enable Europe to export 
its way out of its problems is not 
a desirable policy option from the 
standpoint of global imbalances.N u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 1 8   N O Ve m b e r  2 0 1 1
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these external adjustments can occur without further change 
in the two countries’ nominal effective exchange rates. We 
are less certain, and consider it important that the strategy 
of “internal devaluation” and its new variant, “fiscal devalu-
ation,” be pursued vigorously to help ensure competitive real 
exchange rates that avoid a need to adjust through sluggish 
growth. But, particularly if the IMF projections are taken at 
face value, it is still possible that the needed external sector 
adjustment will take place without recourse to the extreme 
option of exit from the euro.
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Figure A.1     Path of the Chinese yuan against the dollar, euro, yen, and  


































































































































the crAwling peg of the chinese YUAn 
AgAinst the DollAr
Since  June  2010,  the  official  policy  of  China  has  been  to 
pursue a “managed floating exchange rate regime based on 
market  demand  and  supply  with  reference  to  a  basket  of 
currencies” (Hu 2010). In practice, however, the authorities 
appear to have pursued a crawling peg against the dollar, with 
little regard to other major currencies. Moreover, the market 
demand that is allowed to influence the exchange rate is by 
no means the full amount, because reserves have continued 
to  accumulate  massively  as  a  consequence  of  intervention. 
Pure  determination  of  a  floating  rate  by  market  demand 
would mean no intervention. Thus, from end-June 2010 to 
end-August 2011 (the latest date with data available), China’s 
foreign exchange reserves rose from $2.4 trillion to $3.2 tril-
lion (IMF 2011b).
Figure A.1 shows the path of the exchange rate of the 
yuan against the US dollar, euro, yen, and pound sterling 
from January 2010 through July 2011 (end of month rates), 
expressed as indexes with January 2010 = 100. It is evident 
that there is a steady appreciation of the yuan against the dollar 
(gradual decline in the number of yuan per dollar). In partic-
ular, a simple linear regression of the index on time shows a 
highly statistically significant coefficient of –0.42, indicating 
that each month the yuan has appreciated by 0.42 percent 
against the dollar.18 If China’s recent rate of inflation were to 
continue at about 5.5 percent per year and US inflation were 
to average 3 percent, the combined effect of the crawl and 
differential inflation would be to cause real appreciation of the 
RMB against the dollar by 7.7 percent per year (5.2 percent 
for nominal crawl plus 2.5 percent for differential inflation).
In contrast, it is evident in the figure that there is no 
corresponding steady path of the yuan against the other major 
international currencies.
18. With 15 observations, the adjusted R2 is 0.97 and the t-statistic is –22.8. 
This monthly rate translates to 5.2 percent annually (= 1.004212 –1).